rich archival sources on it have scarcely been tapped, and neither Stuart nor Marks have given a comprehensive or very clear picture of what went on there. It is the purpose of this article to partly fill the gap.
The Nkandla district became a crossroads of war when the petty chief Bhambatha of the Zondi tribe, who had begun the rebellion in Natal, found no support among neighbouring chiefs. His insurgent band was being surrounded by strong government forces, so he fled to Zululand. There he found much sympathy and, specifically, the active support of the important chief Sigananda, of the Chube tribe. Sigananda's stronghold was the Nkandla Forest.
The rebellion became a war in which the government militia and police, organized and equipped along contemporary European lines and assisted by levies of loyal Africans organized along traditional lines, were pitted against traditionally organized and primitively equipped native rebels. The rebels took refuge in the Nkandhla Division of Zululand, notable for its rugged terrain and some dense forests. They could sally from the bush to attack, then retire to it and elude pursuers. It took the government ten weeks to defeat the rebels. Strategic points were recognized and contested. The government wanted a pitched battle, in which superior training and technology would assure a victory. The rebels tried to avoid such a battle, and played a kind of hide-and-seek, taxing the patience and wearing down the government while soliciting greater popular support. Both sides sought to win over fence-sitters by propaganda, by appeals and by threats, and then by force. The militia and police could not wage war effectively without the active assistance of loyal chiefs and their followers -indeed, the native levies in the field outnumbered the rebels -however, loyalists and rebels were neighbours, and so the conflict became a civil war. When the territorial lines were drawn, the war became a contest for the resources on which the rebels depended for sustenance.
Thus the policies of politicians and practices of soldiers on both sides intersected with the daily lives and activities of the civilian population. The majority of noncombatants in the operational area were families of rebels; the minority were loyalists, for some tribes divided. Their experience at the crossroads of war was one of random deaths, burnt homesteads, destroyed crops and granaries, and livestock carried off. It is this experience which is the main focus of this paper.
Nkandla and its people
The Nkandla district is at the southwestern corner of Zululand. The Mzinyathi and Thukela Rivers are the southern boundary, and on the left bank the ground rises in broken hills and ridges to the Nkandla-Qudeni mountain range. In several of the southern clefts were primeval forests, collectively known as the Nkandla forest in the East and the Qudeni forest in the West. North of the mountain range is the Mhlatuze river, approximately parallelling the Mzinyathi-Thukela about twenty miles distant. The range broadens to a narrow plateau on the north side, but then the watershed becomes broken and there are no forests. The rivers mentioned are natural boundaries, but the eastern and northwestern boundaries of the Nkandhla magisterial division are artificial, set arbitrarily after Zululand was annexed by the British in 1887 and became part of Natal in 1897. 14 The seat of the magistracy was centrally located, on the eastern slope of Mpandla hill and the settlement was appropriately named Empandhleni. In 1905 the white population of the Nkandhla Division was estimated at just 145 persons. There were one mine and two saw mills, eleven or twelve trading stores, and seven mission stations in the division. In 1906 72 888 acres on the Qudeni range had been opened to European settlement, but only fifteen of the forty-one lots had been taken up. The district was not easily accessible. The few roads were little more than tracks. There were no bridges. 15 The people of the Nkandla were Zulu, but only in the sense of having been subjects of the short-lived Zulu kingdom, established in the early nineteenth century. In 1906 fourteen chiefs and sixteen tribes and portions of tribes resided in the Nkandhla Division. 16 The colonial government preferred to recognize hereditary chiefs of historic tribes as part of a system of indirect rule; however, it could make changes for ease of administration and control. Chiefs owed their position and gave their allegiance to the Supreme Chief, the Governor of the Colony of Natal, 16 See the accompanying map and the appendix for the various tribes and their location.
representing the British Crown. To pay for the administration the government levied a hut tax of 14s.
17
The largest of the tribes, the Chube (or Shezi), was a linguistic sub-group which antedated the Zulu kingdom and had adhered to it without having been conquered. During the Usuthu rebellion of 1888, the chief Sigananda had been an unswerving supporter of the young Zulu king Dinuzulu. The old chief had been an ardent supporter of the Zulu monarchy, and the last king, Cetshwayo, had found sanctuary with him at the end of the Zulu civil war, in 1884. One of Sigananda's headmen was caretaker of Cetshwayo's grave, close by the chief's major homestead.
18
The Magwaza and Ntuli tribes had also been Usuthu partisans. Dinuzulu had been defeated, deposed and exiled, and after ten years had returned, but as a chief only, of the Usuthu tribe in the Ndwandwe Division. None the less many Zulu still regarded him as their king.
19
The African population was estimated at 27 664 in 1905. They were a traditional society engaged in subsistence agriculture, in which cattle were the principal measure of wealth and the medium of exchange. The chief crops were maize and sorghum, eked out with pumpkins, sweet potatoes and other garden 17 See the sources cited in n. 1, and also A. T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal containing earlier political history of the Eastern-Nguni clans (London, Longmans, Green, 1929) Which does not mean that life was a traditional idyll. The magistrate reported that 656 identification passes had been issued and 390 renewed, indicating service being taken in the Colony outside the division, and 727 passes had been issued for service outside the Colony, chiefly in Johannesburg. Presumably the overwhelming majority of these passes were for males, who were reckoned at 11 778. The 1904 census had given 10 852 males, of whom 5338 were over fifteen. It would thus appear that one-third of the male adults were work-seekers away from home for some period of time. The magistrate expressed his concern, for "there can be no doubt that, in large labour centres, such as Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and Johannesburg, the Natives acquire most of their vices and lose their self-respect."
21
The colonial records contain nothing to indicate that such unwholesome contacts contributed directly to resistance to the colonial regime in Nkandla. Much has been written about the competition between the increasing numbers of settlers 20 See SYB, p.13 (population) and pp. 92-93 (crops During the latter part of the South African War the British called into service a small Zulu force under the aegis of Dinuzulu, which had shown its mettle in an encounter with a small Boer commando. In the unsettled postwar period, marked by disappointed expectations and economic depression, the people in Zululand and Natal were agitated by rumours of a change for the better and without the whites, often enough under the lead of Dinuzulu, and it would have been surprising if there had not been a rekindling of Usuthu ambitions. 26 A combination of circumstances made the Nkandla an ideal place in which to nurture and to promote rebellion in 1906. The Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand was quoted telling an investigating commission afterwards:
… The people at Nkandhla doubtless had the feeling that by reason of the ruggedness of their district they were unassailable, but they were also very bitter there on account of the land being taken away from them. The Nkandhla had always been one of the most rebellious districts in the country, and he did think Bambata would have got a footing in any other part of Zululand.
27

Contest for hearts and minds -and position
The colonial government's chief official in Zululand, the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Charles Saunders, went to the Nkandhla magistracy immediately after Bhambatha and his band arrived in the division. The resident magistrate, Benjamin Colenbrander, ordered the chiefs through whose wards Bhambatha might pass to arm their men to intercept and deliver him over. Bhambatha was too quick for them. He passed into Sigananda's ward and hid in the forest. The commissioner repeatedly directed the ninety-six-year-old chief to capture the rebel chieftain, and warned of the consequences of his not doing so. Sigananda procrastinated and dissembled for a week. Then he presented Bhambatha to his own and other tribes as the man sent by Dinuzulu to start a rebellion. The rebels deliberately built their war huts next to the grave of the last Zulu king Cetshwayo. Sigananda and sympathetic headmen also used Bhambatha to promote rebellion in surrounding areas. They branded those loyal to the government "traitors", because they were disloyal to Dinuzulu, and warned them to "plait a long rope with which to climb up to the heavens" to escape his wrath. Most of the Magwaza and Ntuli tribes rebelled, but without their chiefs. Rebels raided other tribes which did not, which as often as not frightened away the tribesmen and antagonized their chiefs. , and the police field force and mounted rifles were posted to Fort Yolland and Ntingwe, respectively, to prevent the spread of the rebellion in those quarters. Across the Thukela, an Umvoti Field Force guarded against a rebel irruption into Natal. 29 Bhambatha and Mangathi, the leader of the rebels among the amaNtuli, may have contemplated an attack on the magistracy, but Sigananda would not have it. They were all agreed on a basic defensive strategy: keep to the forest, entice the enemy in and ambush him in small groups. Under no circumstances attack the enemy's camps or fortified places. 30 By the end of April government forces had more or less contained the rebels in the southern part of the Nkandhla Division.
If Dinuzulu had boldly put himself at the head of the rebels, there probably would have been a largescale uprising; but he did not. He said publicly that he was loyal to the government, and offered to send an army of his followers to the Nkandla to assist in the capture of Bhambatha. The commissioner did not distrust Dinuzulu, but he would not trust his army in the volatile Nkandla. He got him to send his trusted headman Mankulumana to tell Sigananda that he had not instigated the rebellion and to desist from it and to arrange for the capture of Bhambatha. Mankulumana told the commissioner that he was prevented from meeting Sigananda, but had conveyed the desired message to his son and other leading rebels. We cannot be sure just what he said, but in any event it was obvious to all that Dinuzulu was not coming with a force to support the rebels. 31 The rebels were at an impasse. Dinuzulu had let them down, at least for the moment. Without him they had no unity of command. Bhambatha was not an important chief in Natal, and he had no influence as a fugitive in Zululand. Sigananda had much influence, and evidently he was alert mentally, but he had lost his physical strength. It is difficult to determine what power his son and heir Ndabaningi had. It is not clear whether the rebel leaders consulted among themselves or held councils of war. The one singularly energetic leader among the rebel headmen was Mangathi, of the Ntuli tribe, who formed a separate unit and went his own way. Towards the end of period a mounted unit was organized, apparently equipped with firearms, but it does not seem to have had any tactical role -it is mentioned herding looted cattle.
36
Equipment and training were equally primitive. The great majority of men were armed with spears and shields, and the very few who had firearms did not know how to use them properly (in a military sense), except for sniping, but even then most were poor shots. 37 Tactics were as unimaginative as strategy. The rebels knew of and used the traditional Zulu offensive formation -horns, chest, loins -in action at Mpukunyoni and possibly at Bobe and Manzipambana (and one may speculate about the actions at Dlolwana and Msukane).
38
At least morale was high -at the beginning. On the higher plane they had a just cause and were fighting for the old order and the Zulu monarchy. At Manzipambana it seems that the militia under attack were under the impression the rebels were using the horns formation (see Stuart, pp. 287 and 292), but the account of the battle does not confirm that impression. traditional white cow tail badge, and cried "Usuthu!" when they went into battle.
39
Their headquarters and main camp were next to Cetshwayo's grave. 40 Of course, when Dinuzulu denounced them publicly a good number of rebels and rebel sympathizers thought twice, but by then most were committed and afraid to quit.
41
And they believed -at the beginning -that they were invulnerable to the white man's bullets. Bhambatha had them doctored with special medicine so the bullets would not penetrate their bodies.
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The rebel deficiencies became manifest at the battle of Bobe on May 5 th , a chance encounter with a police/militia reconnaissance party out of Fort Yolland. Sigananda's men attacked in the open and found that the white men's bullets indeed penetrated. In one determined charge the attackers lost about sixty killed and fled. Bhambatha's men, moving on one flank through thick bush, then retreated without fighting and without loss.
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There were bitter recriminations between the two 39 On the battle cry "Usuthu!" see Stuart 44 Demoralization and desertion were the consequences. 45 And still no sign of Dinuzulu. Sigananda reported the defeat to him and apparently received a reprimand for bad tactics. 46 The Zululand Field Force, under Colonel Sir Duncan McKenzie, arrived with another convoy at Empandhleni on May 8 th . The Carbineers were relieved and sent back to Natal with the empty wagons. McKenzie moved camp to the edge of the forest and examined the terrain. He proposed to take the offensive, and called on loyal chiefs to furnish levies to accompany the militia. Neutrality was no longer an option for the Nkandla tribes.
McKenzie moved against the rebels at Cetshwayo's grave on May 17 th . He took them by surprise. Mangathi's men attacked one column at Msukane, but were driven off. The other rebel forces offered no resistance. The three government columns met at the grave and bivouacked. Levies burnt the war huts (and accidentally some brush near the grave -which Sigananda described as though it were a provocation in a message to Dinuzulu), collected cattle, and destroyed crops. Next McKenzie moved against Sigananda's stronghold in the Mhome gorge. 47 At this moment Sigananda and Ndabaningi sent emissaries, proposing to surrender -but it would take time to consult the headmen and to collect the people and then to surrender at Empandhleni, not at Mhome. McKenzie was skeptical but patient, and he agreed to a truce and gave them a week to come in. He left a force at the grave, and marched the main column back to the magistracy. The rebels threatened and sniped at the rear guard, provoking a counter fire. There was no surrender. McKenzie and Saunders chalked it up to the old man's deceitfulness. 48 
War on resources
The rebel army lived off the land. They had no depots. The people in the neighbourhood provided food and drink from their homesteads -the produce of their gardens and fields and the stores of their grain pits. 49 Stock would be slaughtered as necessary. 50 When the men were on the move, they carried some food with them, 51 and, when they could, looted loyalists' homesteads and herds and the white men's stores. 52 Sometimes they had to move about just to get food, 53 and some individuals went home to be fed. 54 In late April and early May the Natal Carbineers had "cleared" the area around the magistracy, ostensibly as a security measure, but Mackay also proposed to undercut the rebels by destroying their shelters and supplies. 55 For his part,
McKenzie wrote to the Commandant of Militia on May 11
th : "It is absolutely impossible to starve these people out by sitting quietly on the hills and allowing them to collect provisions everywhere at night, therefore it is absolutely necessary to operate against them and destroy all kraals and provisions." 56 McKenzie's first "clearing" operations were along the fringes of the forest and near Ntingwe. Levies were used extensively. The Umvoti Field Force carried out similar sweeps along the left bank of the Thukela. The effect of these operations was noticeable almost at once. 57 The You should dismount sufficient men for bush operations, retaining enough mounted men only for engaging the enemy when they break cover. My idea is that the bush should be driven by [a] composite force of whites and blacks, in three lines. The first line in extended order, to consist of, say, a hundred picked men who volunteer for the work, each man to have under his control six natives, three on each side of him, and the whole forming the advance line of beaters. They will frequently halt and adjust their general alignment by sound of bugles. The second line of supports within close striking distance of the advanced line to consist, say, of twenty-five picked men each with a group of thirty natives. These men will be pushed forward to assist the advanced line as soon as the group commanders hear or learn that those in front have come into contact with, and are 63 69 It was reported that most of the rebel army in the Nkandla forest left for the Qudeni, and about half of those who had come from Natal deserted. 70 On June 9 th McKenzie considered the Nkandla clear and prepared to move to the Qudeni and drive it. 71 As might be expected, noncombatants and livestock were as likely to be caught in the drives as rebel soldiers. During the first few days of June the commissioner reported that large numbers of women and children flocked out of the forest in all directions. Some of them found refuge with relatives and friends in other tribes. 72 At the start of the drive at Mhome on June 1 st women and children were put on a hill out of the way until the drive was over, and then were sent back to the forest. 73 There was no desire to detain them:
Native women were a source of much inconvenience throughout the campaign. They not only urged their menfolk to rebel and kept them supplied with food as well as they could, but taking advantage of the protection afforded their sex, frequently conveyed intelligence to the enemy as to the movements of the troops.
… Though it was conclusively proved that a good deal of the trouble was caused by the women, who goaded their husbands and relatives to rebellion, their sex secured for them protection by the troops. This the women only knew too well, and on frequent occasions availed themselves of their privilege, probably to the detriment of ourselves, as it was not only difficult but impossible to guard against female spies, who carried information of our movements to the enemy.
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The commissioner complained to the Prime Minister of the Colony about the way militia treated some loyal folk on the line of communication:
… I hope most strict and distinct instructions will be issued that loyal people and their property are not to be molested or interfered with in any way during the operations which may be conducted. Already loyalists have suffered considerably along the line of march of troops to this neighbourhood. This is of course inevitable with [the] movement of large numbers of men and animals and I am causing a record to be kept as far as possible of damage sustained but strongly urge that every precaution be taken in that direction. 75 The magistrate was quite acid about the behaviour of the mercenary troops, in a report accompanying the submission of loss claims after the rebellion:
You will no doubt recollect the large number of Loyalists, particularly between this Magistracy and Owen's store, along the wagon road, who came in to complain that the Militia Columns particularly Col McKenzie's, which consisted of Royston's Horse, and the T.M.R. had looted, or allowed their stock to destroy their gardens, and in some instances individuals from these columns, as the evidence will show, deliberately went and looted property and robbed the kraals of their cash. These people all lodged their complaints at the time, and as you know we took steps to report it to the various O.Cs at the Magistracy, but owing to the Crisis, and state of chaos at the time, nothing could be done, excepting to register such claim, and inform the Claimants that the matter would be dealt with later. The absence of a further recorded complaint at this time suggests that the malpractice might have been corrected. It is counterproductive to plunder one's friends, and on both sides the policy was to spare noncombatants; however, they could get in the way unexpectedly, e.g. the commander of the Umvoti Field Force reported that in one sweep his men had fired at some rebels running across a corn field and unfortunately wounded a woman and child hidden in a corn hut. 77 There was a fear among rebels -how widespread it is not possible to saythat the levies would kill their people. During the truce the rebel emissaries sought and got the military's assurance that the levies would not harm women and children. 78 The levies remaining with the troops at the grave did threaten to kill them if they came in, unless they could hold them to ransom. The authorities reflected and subsequently allowed the levies to ransom captives. The policy might be an added inducement to rebel soldiers to surrender. In many cases levies and captives were related by marriage. 79 The levies from tribes on the periphery of operations also were concerned about the safety of their families. The rebels made a number of raids on exposed homesteads. They burnt them and took the livestock. Men might be killed or captured, but women and children apparently were not harmed. 80 The magistrate also reported in September that he did not know of a single instance of women and children left destitute.
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Both sides looted stock, generally with success. The trick was to get the stock off before the enemy rallied to recover it. The rebels tried to hide their livestock out of reach of the government forces. A favourite place was the steep, wooded Thathe gorge, but after McKenzie scoured it it was clear that no place was safe from drives.
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Distance seemed to offer better protection: at Macala and Kotongweni the government forces were seen coming and large herds were got out of their way during the time it took them to get there.
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Rebel revival and defeat
It is a paradox that in early June as rebel fortunes waned, so they waxed. Rebel strength in the Nkandla forest dwindled owing to heavy losses in men and supplies, yet in the Qudeni it doubled and the rebels even took the offensive.
Mangathi and Bhambatha had just returned from a fruitless visit to Dinuzulu. 84 Their force was now at the Qudeni, and it was joined at the end of May by perhaps 350 men from six different tribes of the Dundee, Nqutu, and Umsinga divisions to the North and West of Nkandhla. They had been slow and halting in rebelling, had suffered several reverses, and were being pushed towards the Qudeni by a column of Natal Carbineers advancing in the same direction. Their principal leader was the Ngobese chief Mehlokazulu.
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The combination of forces now gave the rebels a local superiority. Raids against loyalists in the area increased. 86 Bhambatha may have contemplated a thrust into his old location in Natal. 87 Instead the force moved against the Khabela tribe which had shown great sympathy with the rebellion earlier on, in hope of gaining adherents and also of capturing loyalist cattle which had been moved across the river. The rebels arrived at the Lozeni (Watton's) drift on June 2 nd , and Mangathi crossed with a small party to parley with the Khabela headman Sitoto, who told him that the tribe was now on the government's side and there were strong government forces on the hills behind it. The rebel delegation recrossed the river and the army 85 ): a group of rebels had ambushed a group of militia and levies in the forest: the levies had run away and the militia took casualties for the first time and had to be rescued by reserves. The rebels had been driven off with heavy losses, but for a while they had had the upper hand. In much greater numbers they might engage the militia again in the thick bush, which made men with spears more nearly equal men with guns, and win. 91 On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that the army was really going to strike the government force in camp near the grave and to attack the loyalists in the direction of Eshowe.
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In either case a victory would revive rebel spirits. It might also raise a rebellion in the Eshowe and Emtonjaneni divisions, where tribes were in an unsettled state because of a rumour that Dinuzulu was coming. 93 Just a few days ago Mangathi had 88 Cf. HAZR, pp. 34-35 and Nsuze's account (JSA V, 161) which would date the crossing about June 8 th , and which Stuart, pp. 314-315, follows. Cakijana's account (Resume) would date it about the 7 th proclaimed that Dinuzulu had ordered him to take command and appointed a new set of leaders for the army. Here already was the influential Zulu chief Mehlokazulu. 94 Without a clear-cut victory and a massive uprising to give it the range for further operations the army could not survive long. How could it be fed in the recently cleared and driven land? And for all Mangathi's talk about Dinuzulu's revision of command, the councils were still divided. Mehlokazulu enjoyed the greatest prestige, but he showed little generalship. He had refused to support a sally into Natal. The army arrived at the mouth of the Mhome gorge during the night, tired and cold, and did not bother with outposts. Mehlokazulu dismissed reports of an approaching enemy column. Bhambatha stood by him, but Mangathi and Ndabaningi did not: they took their men into the safety of the gorge. 95 McKenzie's intelligence had learnt of the rebel movement and the columns at Nomangci and near the grave moved by night to intercept it. The result was a surprise attack and the destruction of the rebel army -according to the official estimate 575 were killed, including Mehlokazulu and probably Bhambatha.
96
The battle -massacre -of Mhome on June 10 th signaled the end of the rebellion in Nkandla. 97 The organization and morale of the rebel army were shattered. The death of Mehlokazulu had much more impact on the Zululand chiefs than that of Bhambatha. 98 A corpse said to be Bhambatha's was found in the forest, and the head was cut off, brought to camp, and shown privately to those who could identify it and would publicly attest his death. 99 When asked why they had not surrendered after the negotiations in mid-May, Sigananda answered, "You had not fought us then. We were not conquered." 103 And Ndabaningi replied that "the tribe wished to go on fighting as they did not consider themselves beaten but they now realize that they have been." 104 Both were tried by courts martial and found guilty of high treason, but Sigananda died in gaol before sentencing. Ndabaningi was sentenced to death.
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Retribution and reconstruction
McKenzie estimated on June 21 st that 1200 rebels had been killed in Zululand.
106
The magistrate gave exact figures for the tribes of the Nkandhla Division on September 27 th : 285 killed and 152 missing, a total of 432. 107 Martial law, which had been proclaimed in February, was lifted in October. Between June and September eleven courts martials successively tried fifty of the leading rebels and the magistrate's court in fifty-nine trials dealt with about 1500 of the rank and file. 1334 men were convicted. Sentences ranged from imprisonment for one year to death (commuted to life imprisonment) for the leaders and from imprisonment for two months to five years for their followers. 108 The rebellion in the Nkandla had lasted ten weeks. Fortunately it had ended before famine and disease added to death by war. The rebels suffered great deprivation as a result of the government's operations. Some loyalists suffered deprivation as result of rebel operations. The lives of noncombatants were spared. The government was anxious to be as humane as possible given the hard necessities of its strategy and to be seen to be so, but it was ruthless in the destruction or seizure of rebel property. The number of homesteads destroyed was 753 (compared to loyalists' 44). 109 4727 cattle and 3087 sheep and goats were seized. 110 The magistrate reported in 1907:
Owing to the large number of kraals destroyed during the Rebellion of 1906, which have not yet been rebuilt, the male inmates having been imprisoned and the female inmates having left to seek shelter of the kraals of relatives in other Divisions, it is impossible to give, with any regard to correctness, even an approximate estimate of the present native population of the Division.
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The government established a Rebellion Losses Claim Board, which met at various places to receive claims, then assessed them, and recommended compensation or not. Which amounts were paid out by the colonial treasury, unless, of course, as in the case of livestock compensation, they could be made from loot stock. There do not appear to be separate statements of compensation by division, and one is left to ferret through long lists of individuals whose places of residence are not given. Assessments for fifteen settlers in the Nkandhla Division amounted to £5377-13-8. 112 Natives were compensated by the board for losses of huts and livestock. The stock master at the magistracy stated that 358 head of cattle, 235 goats and 37 sheep were issued to natives as compensation, presumably for stock lost .
The economy was depressed because of other factors which had nothing to do with war, although they compounded its damaging effects. A large number of people in the lowlands along the Thukela died in a malaria epidemic early in 1907. East Coast fever affecting cattle spread throughout Zululand in 1907. Once infected, there was no saving a herd. Despite efforts of settler and native alike in the division to contain it, over half of the cattle in the division perished by the end of 1908. In 1909 the magistrate reported only 1250 head of cattle in good condition in the division, compared to an estimated 12 000 in 1905. Crops, of course, depended on the weather. At the end of the summer in 1907 there was food aplenty in the highlands, but crops in the lowlands had been ravaged by locusts. Early, heavy spring rains brought grub in the maize, but at least the locusts did not return. Evidently the harvest was fair in 1908, but there was great scarcity, threatening famine, in 1909.
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For all this, the magistrate reported that the division had remarkably little crime and stock theft in 1907, and the number of civil cases was only a fifth those in 1905. The trend continued in 1908 and 1909. 123 But these statistics excluded political crime, and in the wake of the rebellion the Nkandha Division became the focus of what the commissioner called a "reign of terror" against loyalist chiefs. It began in August, when the influential (and energetic) chief of the Sibisi tribe, Sitshitshili, was murdered by an unknown assailant. A fortnight later the police investigating officer was shot at. Early in October attempts were made on the lives of Mapoyisa, son and heir of the Ntuli chief Mbuzo, and another important loyalist of the tribe. At the end of November the other Ntuli chief Mpumela was murdered. Several loyalist chiefs received warnings that they were marked men. Alarm and dismay spread through the ranks of the loyal.
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The government proclaimed an amnesty of rank-and-file rebels still at large in October, but it had no effect. 125 Apparently the cause of disorder was not to be found at this level. The government at last had overwhelming evidence implicating Dinuzulu in the rebellion, 126 and it decided to act forcefully. At the end of November it ordered his arrest, proclaimed martial law in Zululand, and mobilized militia in support of the police to bring in the Zulu chief and to pacify Nkandla returned to peace, and in 1909 the magistrate reported favourably on the natives' good conduct, which he attributed to prompt suppression of the rebellion. 131 Making an allowance for his telescoping of the government's actions in the statement, he was right. The Nkandhla Division was a crossroads of wargeographically, politically and economically. The southern part of the division was crisscrossed by opposing forces many times, and the hapless inhabitants of the district experienced considerable deprivation and displacement. A timely end to the war spared them further, dire consequences. 
